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Envy and altruism have been studied extensively in adults. Here,
we report data from an experiment studying envious and altruistic
behavior in children. We study a sample of German school children
aged seven to ten in a natural setting. We run two treatments. One
treatment investigates envy, the other one studies altruism. Addi-
tionally, we collect data on the children’s cognitive and social skills,
and on their socio-demographic background. Controlling for these fac-
tors, we ﬁnd that older children are signiﬁcantly more altruistic. Boys
care more about their relative position than girls. Socio-demographic
information have limited predictive power in both treatments.
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Feelings of envy play an important role in daily economic exchange situations.
On the one hand, envy might lead to ineﬃcient allocations, for example when
consumers spend their money on present consumption of status goods instead
of saving for the future. On the other hand, envy might as well have posi-
tive eﬀects and competitive envy can be seen as a motor of economic growth
and development (e.g. Grolleau et al., 2006, and references therein). While
a number of recent studies have investigated concerns about envy in adults
(e.g. Grolleau et al., 2006; Zizzo and Oswald, 2001), little is known about the
development of envious feelings in children. Do gender diﬀerences in envy
open up early on in life? How are diﬀerences in envy related to cognitive
skills and environmental factors of the children’s life? The answers to these
questions are important: First, because they shed light on the evolutionary
origins of human social behavior, and second, because they are informative as
to what extent behavioral patterns are shaped by society rather than inborn.
Furthermore, children are themselves important economic actors: Their pur-
chasing power in the U.S. and in EU-countries has increased considerably
in recent years (McNeal, 1992), and they potentially have an eﬀect on their
parents’ consumer decisions.
This paper presents an experiment that tests for the existence of envy in
children. Our experiments involve more than 400 German school children;
half of them make active decisions as proposers, the other half are passive
receivers. Because we use school children, we also have detailed and reliable
measures on our participants’ social and intellectual skills as well as on their
socio-demographic background. Consequently, we can control for such dif-
ferences when drawing inferences about gender or age eﬀects. Furthermore,
as we are not able to distinguish between the motives for the non-envious
choice, e.g. one’s own proﬁt maximization or altruism, we also have a treat-
ment which tests for altruism.
While our study focuses on children, its motivation comes from observa-
tions in studies with adults. Among other, studies by Solnick and Hemenway
(1998) and Charness and Grosskopf (2001) show that it is often not the ab-
solute level of payoﬀ that matters most for individual utility but rather one’s
position relative to other individuals. At the same time, there is evidence
that a higher relative income or payoﬀ position translates into higher hap-
piness (e.g. Frey and Stutzer, 2002). In sum, there is much evidence that
people compare with other individuals from their reference group and that
they experience feelings of envy when evaluating their own payoﬀ.
There have recently been a number of economic studies that have inves-
tigated trade and exchange behavior of children. These have been conducted
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on children’s decisions in ultimatum games. Fehr et al. (2008) and Benen-
son et al. (2007) consider simple distribution games. Dahlman et al. (2007)
extend the study by Fehr et al. (2008) with a second stage testing for reci-
procity among children. Harbaugh and Krause (2000) consider dictator and
public good games, and Houser and Schunk (2009) explore to what extent
pro-social behavior in children is inﬂuenced by competitive pressure. These
studies show that altruistic and reciprocal motivations are already present
in young children, and that they tend to increase with age. In addition, the
above studies also forcefully demonstrate that at the age of children in our
study, they are already highly familiar with trade and exchange, as they are
frequently bargaining with parents, teachers, and friends.
Our study extends the existing work mainly through its focus on costly
envy. In contrast to the study of Fehr et al. (2008) where the payoﬀ in
the envy treatment remains constant for the deciding child while only the
receiver’s payoﬀ changes, taking away payoﬀ from other children is costly
for the proposer in our experiment. We believe that making envy costly is
important: First, it helps to clearly separate eﬀects of envy from eﬀects of
inequality aversion; inequality aversion does not play a role in our design as
the distance between the two payoﬀs is always constant, only the direction
changes. Second, since other studies have found that children are strongly
reluctant to give up own payoﬀ, it is far from obvious whether they would
take the envious choice in our design. We thus provide a rigid test of envy
in children.
Additionally, our study oﬀers one key advantage relative to other studies
involving children: We do not only have the experimental observations of the
children, but also measures of their cognitive skills (their grade for math), of
their social skills (their grades for working behavior and social behavior), of
their family background (number of siblings), of the type of sports they are
practicing in their spare time (individual sports versus team sports), as well
as of the reasons for their choice.
The central questions of our paper are:
1. Are children willing to give up a part of their payoﬀ to be relatively
better oﬀ than their opponent?
2. Are children willing to give up payoﬀ to increase their opponent’s payoﬀ
considerably?
3. Are there gender diﬀerences in these eﬀects? and
4. Are these diﬀerences robust to the inclusion of individual diﬀerence
2
Jena Economic Research Papers 2010 - 063measures such as school grades as well as to socio-demographic back-
ground?
As detailed below, we ﬁnd that the answers to the ﬁrst three questions are
”yes”, the answer to the fourth question is mixed.
2 Design of the Artefactual Field Study
Our study was conducted in three elementary public schools in Germany
in January 2008 and November 2009. Two schools are located in Duisburg
in western Germany (henceforth denoted by DS and DU) and one school is
located in Kobern-Gondorf in southwestern Germany (henceforth denoted
by KG).1 In our sample we have a broad range of children from all social
backgrounds, since school attendance is mandatory in Germany.2
We conducted dictator games with 240 dictators, all of whom attended
elementary schools ranging from ﬁrst to fourth grade. Since 32 classes were
involved, we had 32 sessions in total, i.e. one session for each school class.
We ran two treatments, each with the same number of classes distributed as
equally as possible between all school years and locations.
In both treatments the teachers assigned a random number to each child,
which was not publicly announced. Only the teachers and the experimenter
knew the number. Two numbers from children of the same class were ran-
domly matched with the help of casting lots. The role of the proposer was
assigned to the ﬁrst child; the role of the (passive) receiver was assigned to
the second child. After the experimenter had introduced herself to the class,
the proposers were then told one on one by the teacher in the previously
determined order to leave the class room and to go to the experimenter who
was in a separate empty room or empty hallway. Once the child had arrived,
the experimenter carefully explained the game to the child while pointing to
the corresponding payoﬀs. To make the two options salient, the payoﬀs for
the two options were placed on two napkins: The payoﬀ for the proposer was
at the side of the table facing the child; the payoﬀ for the receiver was at the
experimenter’s side. The sides (left/right) of the envious/non-envious and
1Duisburg is a city with almost 500,000 citizens. Kobern-Gondorf is a rural town with
about 3,500 inhabitants.
2Public schools do not charge tuition fees. In 2004 98.2% of all students at the elemen-
tary school level attended public schools. 4.4% of all students at the general education
level in Germany attended a so-called ”F¨ orderschule” in 2004, a special - public or private
- school for mentally or physically challenged students (Bundesamt, 2005). These students
are not part of our sample, since the three schools in our sample do not have any such
students.
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side eﬀect (two-sample test for proportions, p = 0.775, and p = 0.618 in
treatment 1 and 2, respectively). The gummy bears were placed in a way
that it was easy to capture the amount. In addition, we placed a little piece
of paper with a number indicating the amount of gummy bears next to each
payoﬀ (see ﬁgure 1). Thus, the child did not face an abstract choice, but had
the options directly in front of him/her.
Figure 1: Experimental set-up
2.1 Treatment 1: (5:3) vs. (6:8)
In treatment 1, the child could either take ﬁve gummy bears for him/herself
and send three gummy bears to the other child (option A) or (s)he could take
six gummy bears for him/herself and send eight gummy bears to the receiver
(option B, see table 1).3 In all cases, the child who took the decision did not
know with whom (s)he was matched. This was particularly stressed when
explaining the game. Once the decision was completed the experimenter put
the proposer’s payoﬀ into an envelope and handed it to the child. Then
the experimenter placed the payoﬀ for the receiver in a second envelope and
assured the child that the receiver would get the envelope at the end of the
treatment. Nothing else (e.g. messages) was placed into the envelopes. The
receivers remained passive, meaning that they did not become themselves
proposers at any point of the experiment, because we wanted to avoid that
3We have kept payoﬀs low, because children at this age are not able to distinguish
between high numbers.
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of the other child. Also, each proposer participated only in one of the two
treatments to avoid concerns about reciprocity. After the child’s decision the
experimenter interviewed the child (see appendix C) to ﬁnd out about the
reason for the choice, but also to get additional information about the child.
Once the questions were ﬁnished the child went back to his/her classroom and
the next proposer was sent to the experimenter. Children were not allowed to
talk to each other until the experiment was completed. After each treatment
the experimenter went into the classroom and handed the envelopes to the
teacher in the classroom in front of the children who then gave the envelopes
to the corresponding children. Neither the children nor the teacher knew
who had sent which envelope.4
Option Proposer Receiver
Treatment 1 A 5 3
B 6 8
Treatment 2 A 6 3
B 5 8
Table 1: Payoﬀ scheme for treatment 1 and 2
Treatment 1 was designed to ﬁnd out whether children are willing to give
up absolute payoﬀ in order to be relatively better oﬀ (option A (5/3). Giving
up one unit harms the partner by ﬁve units. There are multiple reasons
for opting for B (6/8) like proﬁt maximization, eﬃciency, or altruism, and
treatment 2 investigates these reasons further. When asked for the reasons
for their choice, no child compared him/herself to children outside the game,
for example other proposers in the same class. They only compared their
payoﬀ to the one of their receiver, their reference group in this experiment.
2.2 Treatment 2: (6:3) vs. (5:8)
The second treatment was conducted in the same way as treatment 1 except
that the payoﬀs were six gummy bears for the proposer and three gummy
bears for the receiver and ﬁve gummy bears for the proposer and eight gummy
bears for the receiver in option A and B, respectively (see table 1).5
4In case of an uneven number of students, the remaining child received for ethical
reasons nevertheless an envelope with gummy bears.
5Note that only the payoﬀs of the proposer have been changed for the second treatment.
All other parameters remain the same as in treatment 1.
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altruism. We test whether children are willing to give up one unit of payoﬀ in
order to let another child beneﬁt from ﬁve more units. There are two plausible
reasons for opting for B (5/8); one is altruism, and the other one is eﬃciency
concerns. A reason for choosing option A (6/3) is proﬁt maximization. As
we will show, a considerable fraction of children did not behave rationally
and chose option B (5/8) although this meant giving up one unit of payoﬀ
for him/herself. Note that in this treatment as well as in the other treatment
and unlike in the study by Fehr et al. (2008), inequality aversion cannot play
a role in our task as the distance between the two payoﬀs of the two children
remain the same in both options, only the direction of payoﬀ inequality
changes.
When giving reasons for their choice, no child compared him/herself to
children outside the game, for example other proposers, they only compared
their payoﬀ to the one of the corresponding receiver.
3 Results
In all results, which we report treatment by treatment, we pool the data
from the three locations DS, DU, and KG. The distributions of dictators’
decisions are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent between locations at the 5%-level in
both treatments except for treatments 1 where boys in DS and DU and girls
in DS and KG diﬀer in behavior (two-sample test of proportion, stratiﬁed
by gender, see table 2). The reported results are based on the full sample of
children. To show that all results also fully hold if we exclude children with
reasons biasing their choices, we report them in the appendix.6
p-values
treatment 1 treatment 2
female male female male
DS/DU 0.668 0.001 0.737 0.717
DS/KG 0.037 0.078 0.143 0.773
DU/KG 0.072 0.168 0.247 0.555
Table 2: Two-sample test of proportion for diﬀerent locations in both treat-
ments, separately for gender
6We excluded those who did not understand the game, claimed to be on a diet, were
not hungry, did not like gummy bears, or are not allowed to eat candy. For the results of
the tests with the limited sample, see appendix A.
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First, we look at the results of treatment 1 by gender and age. Figure 2 shows
the fraction of children choosing option A (5/3) separately for diﬀerent age
groups. Strikingly, we observe that despite the costs associated with envy, a
considerable fraction of children took the envious choice.
Figure 2: Fraction of children taking envious choice 5/3 in treatment 1
In particular, we observe a signiﬁcant gender eﬀect (female: P > |z| =
0.018, coeﬃcient= −0.828) with boys opting for the envious choice A (5/3)
more frequently than girls. The fraction of boys and girls choosing option A
in treatment 1 was 39.1% and 21.7%, respectively.
Result 1: Boys take the envious choice more often than girls.
This cannot be due to diﬀerent preferences for candies by boys and girls,
because we asked the children which gender usually wants more candies.
13.0% of the children that gave an answer to this question stated that girls
want more, 38.9% said that boys want more candies. But the largest fraction
of 48.1% argued that boys and girls want as many candies.7
This ﬁnding about more envy behavior among boys than among girls
is in line with studies by Gneezy and Rustichini (2004) and Houser and
Schunk (2009) who investigated competition among school children as well
7Note that we do not have this information about children attending school in DS and
DU in the session of 2008.
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Dummy 8 years 1.168*** (0.421)
Dummy 9 years 0.214 (0.403)
Dummy 10 years -0.277 (0.639)
Female -0.828** (0.350)
Grade math 0.115 (0.198)
Grade social behavior -0.074 (0.348)
Grade working behavior 0.193 (0.341)
Dummy team sport −0.513⋆ (0.318)
Number of siblings 0.195⋆ (0.119)
Constant -0.720* (0.407)
Observations: 98; R2 = 0.163
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1, ⋆ p < 0.11
Table 3: Probit regression on taking the envious choice 5/3 in treatment 1
as with ﬁndings by Gneezy et al. (2003) who investigated adults. The studies
mentioned above point in the direction that it is more important for boys to
be relatively better oﬀ and that in a competitive environment boys perform
better than girls. Our results complement their ﬁndings, suggesting that
envy is an important driving force behind these observations.
Furthermore, we observe a U-shaped relation between age and envious
behavior. Children at the age of 8 take the envious option A (5/3) the most
frequently (see ﬁgure 2). This implies that at the beginning of school atten-
dance being relatively better oﬀ seems to become more and more important,
but from a certain age on children do not care about being better oﬀ so much
anymore.
A widely discussed issue is to what extent the presence of siblings aﬀects
the development of social behavior. We ﬁnd that the more siblings a child
has the more likely it is to opt for the envious choice A (number of siblings:
P > |z| = 0.101, coeﬃcient=0.195, see table 3), although this result slightly
fails to be signiﬁcant.
There seems to be converging evidence for an impact of the number of
siblings on pro-social behavior. Fehr et al.’s (2008) results point into the
same direction as our results. They ﬁnd that single children share more than
children who have siblings.
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opt for choice A (5/3) than children who do not practice sport or who practice
an individual sport (dummy team sport: P > |z| = 0.106, coeﬃcient=0.513).
Learning how to cooperate or help each other during sport activities seems
to have an inﬂuence on social decisions outside the gym.
In addition to the above mentioned data we have three school grades that
were reported on the children’s annual report card: A grade for mathematics,
a grade for working behavior, and a grade for social behavior.8
The regression for treatment 1 (see table 3) reveals that grades do not
have any predictive power for the actual choices of the children, although the
grade for social behavior is meant to indicate how nicely the child behaves
at school towards other children and teachers.
Zizzo and Oswald (2001) ﬁnd in a study about envy in adults that about
2/3 of the participants are willing to pay to reduce somebody else’s outcome.
The decision to do so is insensitive to the price of doing so, that is how
much outcome of another person you can destroy with one unit of your
outcome. We have shown that this willingness to pay for reducing somebody
else’s outcome is already present in children. They seem to care about their
relative position.
We have asked the children for the reason for their choice and let two stu-
dent assistants classify these answers in a double blind procedure into twelve
categories: No answer given, proﬁt maximization, envy, altruism, eﬃciency,
not allowed to eat candies, misunderstood the game, on a diet, not hungry,
does not like candies, other, and excuse.9
8Children at this age have many more grades on their annual report card, e.g. grades
for performance in German language, in sports, in arts etc. For anonymity reasons, we
were only allowed to obtain three school grades. The mathematics grade seemed most
interesting as a measure for cognitive capacities, and the grades for working and social be-
havior seemed most interesting for social preferences. Mathematics performance is graded
on an integer scale from 1 to 6, where 1 is the best grade, and 6 is the worst possible
grade. Social and working behavior is graded on an integer scale from 1 to 4, 1 is the best
grade, 4 is the worst grade. Unfortunately, we did not receive grades of all children of
the second session. Some teachers only provided as with an estimation of the children’s
performance (above average, average, below average), some teachers did not provide any
grades, especially for the children that do not yet oﬃcially get school grades. For this
reason, we transformed the school grades (class 1 and 2) we received to estimations (grade
1.0-2.3: above average (1); grades 2.4-3.3: average (0); grades 3.4-6.0: below average (-1))
and used these estimations of the children’s performance for our analysis (math: mean:
0.33, sd: 0.76; social behavior: mean: 0.73, sd: 0.50; working behavior: mean: 0.62, sd:
0.57). The missing grades are also the reason why the number of observations in the
regressions is smaller than our actual number of observations in both treatments.
9For the frequency and proportion of answers in treatment 1, see table 8 in appendix
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23% of those children claimed that they did this because of envy, 9 out of
35 (26%) found an excuse, but most of the children (37%) did not give an
answer.
Out of the 75 children that took the non-envious option B, most children
(41%) claimed altruistic reasons; they wanted the other child to receive more
candies (see table 8 in appendix A). Our second treatment tested this rea-
soning. As we will see, these arguments are credible as many children were
even willing to give up one gummy bear to make the other child receive ﬁve
more candies. This is line with other studies, e.g. by Benenson et al. (2007).
As the results show, children do more often not give a reason for their
choice if they took the envious choice (37% vs. 29%). This might be due to
the fact that envy is a cultural taboo that people do not talk about. People
are even less willing to admit that they experience envious feelings, even if
this is the only reason that can explain their behavior. This argumentation is
supported by the fact that only when making the choice (5/3) nine out of the
35 children (26%) very obviously used an excuse while when taking the (6/8)
option none of the children used an excuse. Also, children often took a longer
time to ﬁnd a response, or blushed, or rather looked down than towards the
experimenter when asked for an explanation. In their study with students
Grolleau et al. (2006) ﬁnd that participants state less often destructive envy
which destroys another person’s income if they are asked about their own
feelings than if they are asked what another person will feel in this situation.
This supports the view that envy is a cultural taboo.
Only 3 out of 75 children opting for (6/8) claimed eﬃciency reasons. This
makes us believe that eﬃciency is not present as a concept in children of that
age. They rather look at their own payoﬀ and the payoﬀ of the other child
separately as we could also see from their reasons for their choice instead of
caring about the total payoﬀ for the paired children.
3.2 Treatment 2
Now we look at the results of treatment 2. Figure 3 shows the fraction of
children choosing option B (5/8) separately for the diﬀerent age groups.
We observe an age eﬀect: The older the children the more likely they
take the altruistic option. The increase is statistically signiﬁcant in 9- and
10-year-olds compared to 7-year-olds, but not for 8-year-olds (see table 4).
While 28.6% of the children at the age of 7 take the altruistic choice the
fraction of children doing this increases monotonically with age. 75.0% of
A.
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the children at the age of 10 are willing to give up one gummy bear to make
the receiving child better oﬀ.
Result 2: The older children are the more likely they take the altruistic
choice.
Our results ﬁt the results of Fehr et al. (2008) who ﬁnd an increase of
altruistic choices with increasing age (from 18% at age three/four to 29.5%
at age eight/nine). Children in our study are older than those in Fehr et al.
(2008). In line with ﬁndings in developmental psychology, our children be-
have more altruistically and interestingly, we still ﬁnd an increase in altruism
with age.
Again, we had asked children about the reasons for their choice (see table
9 in appendix A). More than half (53%) of the 64 children choosing the
non-altruistic option A (6/3) did not give a reason for their choice while only
36% out of the children taking the altruistic choice did not give a reason.
The reason the most (45%) often argued for the choice B (5/8) was that
proposers wanted to be nice to the receiver (altruism), which is credible,
because they even had to give up one unit of payoﬀ to do so. This shows
that many children at that age already know which behavior would have
been the ”kind” one. Only three out of the 66 children taking option B (5/8)
claimed eﬃciency reasons. Eﬃciency reasoning seems not to be present in
children of that age.
11
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Dummy 8 years 0.419 (0.421)
Dummy 9 years 0.913** (0.403)
Dummy 10 years 1.265*** (0.639)
Female 0.142 (0.350)
Grade math 0.134 (0.198)
Grade social behavior 0.256 (0.348)
Grade working behavior -0.399 (0.341)
Dummy teamsport 0.581** (0.318)
Number of siblings 0.117 (0.119)
Constant -1.002** (0.407)
Observations: 103; R2 = 0.129
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1
Table 4: Probit regression on taking the altruistic choice 5/8 in treatment 2
4 Conclusion
We used an experiment to investigate social preferences of German children
aged seven to ten attending public primary schools. The sample includes
children from very diverse social backgrounds. Moreover, the experiment
took place in a natural setting, the school, and was incentivized using gummy
bears - one of the most popular candies among German children.
We wanted to ﬁnd out two things: Are children envious and care about
their relative standing? Does altruism already exist at this age or is it due
to socialization in adolescence? We had additional information about the
children’s cognitive and social skills, as well as on their socio-demographic
background. With this information we shed light on the question which
environmental factors inﬂuence the behavior of children.
We found that a considerable fraction of children was willing to give up
payoﬀ in order to be relatively better oﬀ than their unknown partner. Inter-
estingly, this fraction was higher for boys than for girls suggesting that boys
are more concerned about their relative position. This is in line with the ﬁnd-
ing by Houser and Schunk (2009) and Gneezy and Rustichini (2004) who ﬁnd
that boys are more competitive than girls. This behavior can be explained
by the fact that in former times men were involved in many more competitive
activities than women such as conﬂicts between tribes and groups.
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an early age. A considerable fraction of children was willing to give up payoﬀ
to make their unknown partner better oﬀ. Here, we can see a clear age trend.
The older the children of our sample are, the more likely they behaved in a
pro-social way.
We found a gender eﬀect in the ﬁrst treatment and an age eﬀect in the
second treatment. While our results are very much in line with the results
reported in Fehr et al. (2008), we have one main methodological diﬀerence:
In our study, taking the envious choice is a costly action, since we believe
that this is important to reliably identify truly envious actions.
A further advantage of our sample is that we have measures on the chil-
dren’s cognitive and social abilities and on their working attitude. We have
also information about the socio-demographic background of the children
like the number of siblings, and whether the children are doing team sports
in their spare time. Having more siblings and not practicing team sports
increases the probability to take the envious option in treatment 1 although
this eﬀect is barely not signiﬁcant. In the second treatment we have seen
that children that practice a team sport in their spare time are more likely
to take the altruistic choice. Other variables like the grade for social behavior
or the math grade do not have an eﬀect.
Future research might extend our results in three ways. First, it is known
that adults care about their relative standing (e.g. Solnick and Hemenway,
1998). As we have shown, this is also true for a considerable fraction of chil-
dren in primary schools. At which age do these concerns emerge? According
to Piaget (1952) children younger than our sample are very egocentric and do
not think about the consequences their behavior will have for others. Thus,
they should also not care about their relative standing and behave like proﬁt
maximizers. This still needs to be tested with an experiment with younger
children than in our sample. Second, is this behavior innate and unique in
all humans or is it acquired during childhood? If the latter is true, does this
behavior depend on the social background or on culture? H¨ ager et al. (2010)
conducted an artefactual ﬁeld experiment with children from the egalitarian
nomadic tribe of the Penan in Malaysia to test this. Further experiments
with children from diﬀerent cultures would be desirable. Third, would chil-
dren behave the same way if they grew up in a non-competitive environment?
A ﬁrst answer to this question is given by an experimental study by Shapira
and Madsen (1969) which comes to the result that children living in a kib-
butz are more cooperative than children living in cities in Israel. H¨ ager et al.
(2010) shed further light on this by comparing Penan children raised in an
egalitarian tribe to children in our German sample. Nevertheless, this topic
remains an open question and demands further research.
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p-values
treatment 1 treatment 2
female male female male
DS/DU 0.853 0.001 0.862 0.647
DS/KG 0.037 0.101 0.228 0.768
DU/KG 0.053 0.118 0.295 0.473
Table 5: Two-sample test of proportion for diﬀerent locations in both treat-
ments, separately for gender, without subjects stating reasons 5, 6, 7, 8, and
9 and without subjects who did not understand the game
Probit regression on envious choice 5/3
Dummy 8 years 1.132*** (0.428)
Dummy 9 years 0.114 (0.408)
Dummy 10 years -0.252 (0.652)
Female -0.678* (0.373)
Grade math 0.149 (0.207)
Grade social behavior -0.206 (0.387)
Grade working behavior 0.357 (0.389)
Dummy teamsport -0.373 (0.342)
Number of siblings 0.149 (0.141)
Constant -0.729* (0.419)
Observations: 93; R2 = 0.151
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1
Table 6: Probit regression on taking the envious choice 5/3 in treatment 1
(without reasons 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 and without children that did not under-
stand the task)
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Dummy 8 years 0.429 (0.401)
Dummy 9 years 0.877** (0.394)
Dummy 10 years 1.188** (0.484)
Female -0.034 (0.307)
Grade math behavior 0.156 (0.217)
Grade social behavior 0.398 (0.385)
Grade working behavior -0.434 (0.344)
Dummy teamsport 0.456 (0.303)
Number of siblings 0.133 (0.099)
Constant -0.960** (0.418)
Observations: 95; R2 = 0.122
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1
Table 7: Probit regression on taking the altruistic choice 5/8 in treatment 2
(without reasons 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 and without children that did not under-
stand the task)
Reason 5/3 6/8
girls boys all girls boys all
No answer given 5 (50%) 8 (32%) 13 (37%) 11 (31%) 11 (28%) 22 (29%)
Proﬁt maximization 0 0 0 5 (14%) 6 (15%) 11 (15%)
Envy 4 (40%) 4 (16%) 8 (23%) 0 0 0
Altruism 0 0 0 15 (42%) 16 (41%) 31 (41%)
Eﬃciency 0 0 0 1 (3%) 2 (5%) 3 (4%)
No candy allowed 0 0 0 1 (3%) 0 1 (1%)
Misunderstood game 0 2 (8%) 2 (6%) 1 (3%) 1 (3%) 2 (3%)
On diet 0 0 0 0 0 0
Not hungry 0 0 0 0 0 0
Doesn’t like candy 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other 0 3 (12%) 3 (9%) 2 (6%) 3 (8%) 5 (7%)
Excuse 1 (10%) 8 (32%) 9 (26%) 0 0 0 P
10 25 35 36 39 75
Table 8: Reasons for choice given by subjects, treatment 1
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girls boys all girls boys all
No answer given 9 (26%) 15 (48%) 24 (36%) 22 (63%) 12 (41%) 34 (53%)
Proﬁt maximization 0 0 0 5 (14%) 7 (24%) 12 (19%)
Envy 0 0 0 0 4 (14%) 4 (6%)
Altruism 19 (54%) 11 (35%) 30 (45%) 0 0 0
Eﬃciency 2 (6%) 1 (3%) 3 (5%) 0 0 0
No candy allowed 0 1 (3%) 1 (2%) 0 0 0
Misunderstood game 1 (3%) 0 1 (2%) 0 2 (7%) 2 (3%)
On diet 0 1 (3%) 1 (2%) 0 0 0
Not hungry 1 (3%) 0 1 (2%) 0 0 0
Doesn’t like candy 1 (3%) 2 (6%) 3 (5%) 0 0 0
Other 2 (6%) 0 2 (3%) 5 (14%) 2 (7%) 7 (11%)
Excuse 0 0 0 3 (9%) 2 (7%) 5 (8%) P
35 31 66 35 29 64
Table 9: Reasons for choice given by subjects, treatment 2
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Experimental protocol of the proceeding
• Teachers of the participating classes prepare a list for each class. On
these lists we ﬁnd no names, but a randomly assigned number for each
child in order to ensure complete anonymity. In addition, teachers
provide us with data about the gender, the age at the day of the ex-
periment, school grades in math, social- and working behavior, as well
as the degree of education of the parents classiﬁed as below average,
average, or above average.
• The children of one class are randomly matched in pairs by drawing
lots without knowing with whom they are paired. The ﬁrst child gets
the role of the proposer, the second child gets the role of the receiver.
• The class pursues its normal teaching procedure, often as individual
work. The proposers go one by one in random order to the experimenter
who is located in a separate empty room or empty hallway with her
experimental set up. When one child returns to the class, the next one
is sent to the experimenter.
• The experimenter sits at a table. To make it easy for the child to
capture the diﬀerent options, each of the two options (5/3 vs. 6/8 and
6/3 vs. 5/8 for treatment 1 and 2, respectively) is arranged on a napkin
with the payoﬀ for the proposing child at the side of the table where
the child sits and the payoﬀ for the responder at the side of the table
where the experiments sits. The gummy bears are placed in a way to
make it easy to immediately see the diﬀerent amount. In addition, we
placed a little piece of paper with a number indicating the amount of
gummy bears next to each payoﬀ (see ﬁgure 1).
• The experimenter explains the game to the child and asks for a choice,
underlining the fact that (s)he does not know with whom (s)he is
matched.
• After the child’s decision, the gummy bears are placed into envelopes.
The proposer’s envelope is directly handed out to him and the child is
assured that the other child will receive the other envelope after the
experiment is completed in his/her class.
• Then a couple of questions follow (see appendix C ).
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casually asks the proposer about the reasons for his/her choice.
• After all proposers of one class have played the game, the experimenter
goes into the class room and hands the envelopes for the receivers to
the teachers. The teacher hands out the envelopes to the corresponding
children. If there was an uneven number of children in one class, the
child that was not matched with a partner also received for ethical
reasons an envelope with gummy bears.
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Protocol of the interaction/interview with each proposer during
the experiment
Experimenter (E): Hallo! Sit down. Your task is to split up gummy bears.
You can take some for yourself and send some to another child. The other
child is in your class, but you don’t know which one of them it will be,
because this will be randomly drawn. You can either take 5 (6) gummy
bears for yourself and send 3 to the other child or you can take 6 (5) for
yourself and send 8 to the other child.
[If you choose this side (E. pointing at one side of the table), who will
then get how many gummy bears?
Child (C): I would get ... and the other child would get ...
E: Correct. (Or repeating this question with re-explanation of the game until
the child understands it although this rarely happened.)]10
What do you want to do?
C: I take ... for myself and send ... to the other child.
E: What do you think, who wants usually more candies? Boys, girls, or do
both want as much as possible (these three options in random order)?
C: ...
E: How many brothers and sisters do you have?
C: ...
E: What do you want to be later?
C: ...
E: Do you like gym classes at school?
C: ...
E: Do you do sports beyond school?
10The text in squared brackets was only employed in the session in November 2009. In
the session of January 2008 the understanding of the task was inferred from the child’s
answer to the task.
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If yes, E: What kind of sports?
C: ...
E: Are you member of a club?
C: ...
E: Why have you decided this way?
C: ...
E: Thank you for participating. The other child will receive the envelope in
a moment. Bye.
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Experimentleiterin (E): Hallo! Setz dich. Deine Aufgabe ist es Gummib¨ archen
aufzuteilen. Du nimmst welche f¨ ur dich selbst und schickst welche an ein an-
deres Kind. Das andere Kind ist in deiner Klasse, aber du weißt nicht, wer
von ihnen das ist, denn dies wird zuf¨ allig ausgelost. Du kannst entweder 5
(6) Gummib¨ archen f¨ ur dich nehmen und 3 an das andere Kind schicken oder
6 (5) Gummib¨ archen f¨ ur dich nehmen und 8 an das andere Kind schicken.
[Wenn du diese Seite nimmst (E. auf eine Seite zeigend), wer bekommt
dann wie viele Gummib¨ archen ?
Kind (K): Dann bekomme ich ... und das andere Kind ...
E: Richtig. (Falls die Antwort falsch war wurde das Spiel nochmals erkl¨ art
und die Frage wiederholt, was selten der Fall war.)]11
E: Was machst du?
Kind (K): Ich nehme ... f¨ ur mich und ... f¨ ur das andere Kind.
E: Wer, glaubst du, will normalerweise mehr S¨ ußigkeiten haben? Jungen,
M¨ adchen oder wollen alle immer m¨ oglichst viel haben (diese drei Optionen
in zuf¨ alliger Reihenfolge)?
K: ...
E: Wie viele Br¨ uder und Schwestern hast du?
K: ...
E: Was m¨ ochtest du sp¨ ater werden?
K: ...
E: Machst du gerne Sport in der Schule?
K: ...
E: Machst du nach der Schule Sport?
K: ...
11Der Text in eckigen Klammern wurde nur bei der Datenerhebung im November 2009
gesagt. Bei der Datenerhebung im Januar 2008 wurde von der Formulierung der Antwort
des Kindes inferiert, ob dieses die Aufgabe verstanden hat.
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K: ...
E: Bist du im Verein?
K: ...
E: Warum hast du dich so entschieden?
K: ...
E: Vielen Dank f¨ urs Mitmachen. Das andere Kind bekommt den Umschlag
gleich vorbeigebracht. Tsch¨ uß.
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